Growth and Intellectual Property

Michele Boldrin and David Levine

No 12769, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Intellectual property (IP) protection involves a trade-off between the undesirability of monopoly and the desirable encouragement of creation and innovation. Optimal policy depends on the quantitative strength of these two forces. We give a quantitative assessment of current IP policies. We focus particularly on the scale of the market, showing that as it increases, due either to growth or to the expansion of trade, IP protection should be reduced.

JEL-codes: A10 D0 D00 D02 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino, nep-int, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-reg
Note: EFG
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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