Antitrust and Regulation

Dennis Carlton and Randal C. Picker

No 12902, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Since the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act (1897) and the Sherman Act (1890), regulation and antitrust have operated as competing mechanisms to control competition. Regulation produced cross-subsidies and favors to special interests, but specified prices and rules of mandatory dealing. Antitrust promoted competition without favoring special interests, but couldn't formulate rules for particular industries. The deregulation movement reflected the relative competencies of antitrust and regulation. Antitrust and regulation can also be viewed as complements in which regulation and antitrust assign control of competition to courts and regulatory agencies based on their relative strengths. Antitrust also can act as a constraint on what regulators can do. This paper uses the game-theoretic framework of political bargaining and the historical record of antitrust and regulation to establish and illustrate these points.

JEL-codes: K2 K21 K23 L4 L43 L44 L5 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-his, nep-law and nep-reg
Note: IO LE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

Published as Antitrust and Regulation , Dennis W. Carlton, Randal C. Picker. in Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned? , Rose. 2014

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