Bargaining Around the Hearth

Robert Pollak

No 13142, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In "Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth" (Yale Law Journal, 2006) Robert Ellickson argues that as long as members of a household expect their relationship to continue, norms, rather than law, will determine allocations among them. More specifically, Ellickson argues that in "midgame" household members either ignore the "endgame" completely or, if they do take endgame considerations into account, the relevant endgame considerations are determined by norms rather than by law. This paper examines the fit between Ellickson's claims and four bargaining models that economists have used to understand interactions within household and families.

JEL-codes: D1 J12 K36 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe and nep-law
Note: LE LS
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published as "Bargaining Around the Hearth, ” 116 Yale Law Journal . Pocket Part 414 (2007)

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