Who Gets What from Employer Pay or Play Mandates?
Richard Burkhauser () and
Kosali Simon ()
No 13578, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Critics of pay or play mandates, borrowing from the large empirical minimum wage literature, provide evidence that they reduce employment. Borrowing from a smaller empirical minimum wage literature, we provide evidence that they also are a blunt instrument for funding health insurance for the working poor. The vast majority of those who benefit from pay or play mandates which require employers to either provide appropriate health insurance for their workers or pay a flat per hour tax to offset the cost of health care live in families with incomes twice the poverty line or more and, depending on how coverage is determined, the mandate will leave a significant share of the working poor ineligible for such benefits either because their hourly wage rate is too high or they work for smaller exempt firms.
JEL-codes: I18 I32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
Note: HC HE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Published as Richard V. Burkhauser & Kosali I. Simon, 2008. "Who Gets What From Employer Pay or Play Mandates?," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 11(1), pages 75-102, 03.
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Who Gets What From Employer Pay or Play Mandates? (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13578
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().