A Quantile-based Test of Protection for Sale Model

Susumu Imai, Hajime Katayama and Kala Krishna ()

No 13900, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper proposes a new test of the Protection for Sale (PFS) model by Grossman and Helpman (1994). Unlike existing methods in the literature, our approach does not require any data on political organizations. We formally show that the PFS model predicts that the quantile regression of the protection measure on the inverse import penetration ratio divided by the import demand elasticity, should yield a positive coefficient for quantiles close to one. We test this prediction using the data from Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000). The results do not provide any evidence favoring the PFS model.

JEL-codes: F13 F14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ore and nep-pol
Note: ITI PE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Published as Journal of International Economics Volume 91, Issue 1, September 2013, Pages 40–52

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Related works:
Journal Article: A quantile-based test of protection for sale model (2013)
Working Paper: A Quantile-based Test of Protection for Sale Model (2013)
Working Paper: A Quantile-based Test of Protection for Sale Model (2010)
Working Paper: A Quantile-based Test of Protection for Sale Model (2010)
Working Paper: A Quantile Based Test Of Protection For Sale Model (2007)
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