Non-Economic Engagement and International Exchange: The Case of Environmental Treaties
Andrew Rose and
Mark Spiegel
No 13988, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
We examine the role of non-economic partnerships in promoting international economic exchange. Since far-sighted countries are more willing to join costly international partnerships such as environmental treaties, environmental engagement tends to encourage international lending. Countries with such non-economic partnerships also find it easier to engage in economic exchanges since they face the possibility that debt default might also spill over to hinder their non-economic relationships. We present a theoretical model of these ideas, and then verify their empirical importance using a bilateral cross-section of data on international cross-holdings of assets and environmental treaties. Our results support the notion that international environmental cooperation facilitates economic exchange.
JEL-codes: F10 F34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env
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Published as Andrew K. Rose & Mark M. Spiegel, 2009. "Noneconomic Engagement and International Exchange: The Case of Environmental Treaties," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(2-3), pages 337-363, 03.
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Related works:
Journal Article: Noneconomic Engagement and International Exchange: The Case of Environmental Treaties (2009)
Journal Article: Noneconomic Engagement and International Exchange: The Case of Environmental Treaties (2009) 
Working Paper: Non-Economic Engagement and International Exchange: The Case of Environmental Treaties (2006) 
Working Paper: Non-economic engagement and international exchange: the case of environmental treaties (2006) 
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