Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy
Pedro Dal Bó,
Andrew Foster and
Louis Putterman
No 13999, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
A novel experiment is used to show that the effect of a policy on the level of cooperation is greater when it is chosen democratically by the subjects than when it is exogenously imposed. In contrast to the previous literature, our experimental design allows us to control for selection effects (e.g. those who choose the policy may be affected differently by it). Our finding implies that democratic institutions may affect behavior directly in addition to having effects through the choice of policies. Our findings have implications for the generalizability of the results of randomized policy interventions.
JEL-codes: C10 C9 D7 O10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-pol and nep-soc
Note: POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
Published as Pedro Dal Bo & Andrew Foster & Louis Putterman, 2010. "Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2205-29, December.
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Related works:
Journal Article: Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy (2010)
Working Paper: Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy (2007)
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