EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Pharmaceutical Industry, Drug Quality and Regulation: Evidence from US and Italy

Vincenzo Atella, Jay Bhattacharya and Lorenzo Carbonari

No 14567, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between drug price and drug quality and how it varies across two of the most common regulatory regimes in the pharmaceutical market: minimum efficacy standards (MES) and a mix of minimum efficacy standards and price control mechanisms (MES+PC). Through a simple model of adverse selection we model the interaction between firms, heterogeneous buyers and the regulator. The theoretical analysis provides two results. First, an MES regime provides greater incentives to produce high quality drugs. Second, an MES+PC mix reduces the difference in price between the highest and lowest quality drugs on the market. The empirical analysis based on US and Italian data corroborates these results.

JEL-codes: I1 L51 L65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-hea, nep-ind, nep-mic and nep-reg
Note: EH
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published as Pharmaceutical industry, drug quality and regulation.Evidence from US and Italy Journal Article Authors Vincenzo Atella - Stanford University Jay Bhattacharya - Stanford University Carbonari, L. Published by Health Service Research, Vol. 47 no. 1 pt 1, page(s) 293-308 February 2012

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14567.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Pharmaceutical industry, drug quality and regulation. Evidence from US and Italy (2008) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14567

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14567

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14567