The Value of Making Commitments Externally: Evidence from WTO Accessions

Man-Keung Tang and Shang-Jin Wei

No 14582, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper studies the value of external commitment to policy reforms in the case of WTO/GATT accessions. The accessions often entail reforms that go beyond narrowly defined trade liberalization, and have to overcome fierce resistance in the acceding countries, as reflected in protracted negotiations. We study the growth and investment consequences of WTO/GATT accessions, with attention to a possible selection bias. We find that the accessions tend to raise income , but only for those countries that were subject to rigorous accession procedures. Policy commitments associated with the accessions were helpful, especially for countries with poor governance.

JEL-codes: F1 F5 O4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-12
Note: IFM ITI
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published as Tang, Man-Keung & Wei, Shang-Jin, 2009. "The value of making commitments externally: Evidence from WTO accessions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 216-229, July.

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Journal Article: The value of making commitments externally: Evidence from WTO accessions (2009)
Working Paper: The Value of Making Commitments Externally: Evidence from WTO Accessions (2009)
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