Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match
Parag Pathak and
Alvin Roth ()
No 14864, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs among efficiency, stability and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences--ties--in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school --single tie breaking-- in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tie breaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions.
JEL-codes: C78 D60 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published as Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. 2009. "Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match." American Economic Review, 99(5): 1954-78.
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