EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match

Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag Pathak and Alvin Roth ()

No 14864, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs among efficiency, stability and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences--ties--in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school --single tie breaking-- in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tie breaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions.

JEL-codes: C78 D60 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-lab and nep-ure
Date: 2009-04
Note: ED PE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (56) Track citations by RSS feed

Published as Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. 2009. "Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match." American Economic Review, 99(5): 1954-78.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14864.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14864

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14864

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2019-08-20
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14864