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Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments

Claudio Ferraz () and Frederico Finan ()

No 14937, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Political institutions can affect corruption. We use audit reports from an anti-corruption program in Brazil to construct new measures of political corruption in local governments and test whether electoral accountability affects the corruption practices of incumbent politicians. We find significantly less corruption in municipalities where mayors can get reelected. Mayors with re-election incentives misappropriate 27 percent fewer resources than mayors without re-election incentives. These effects are more pronounced among municipalities with less access to information and where the likelihood of judicial punishment is lower. Overall our findings suggest that electoral rules that enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining politician's corrupt behavior.

JEL-codes: D72 D78 H41 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dev, nep-pol, nep-ppm and nep-soc
Note: POL
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Published as Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2011. "Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1274-1311, June.

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