Legal Protection in Retail Financial Markets

Bruce I. Carlin and Simon Gervais ()

No 14972, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Given the importance of sound advice in retail financial markets and the fact that financial institutions outsource their advice services, what legal rules maximize social welfare in the market? We address this question by posing a theoretical model of retail markets in which a firm and a broker face a bilateral hidden action problem when they service clients in the market. All participants in the market are rational, and prices are set based on consistent beliefs about equilibrium actions of the firm and the broker. We characterize the optimal law within our modeling context, and derive how the legal system splits the blame between parties to the transaction. We also analyze how complexity in assessing clients and conflicts of interest affect the law. Since these markets are large, the implications of the analysis have great welfare import.

JEL-codes: G18 K2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn, nep-cta and nep-reg
Note: CF
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published as Legal Protection in Retail Financial Markets (with Simon Gervais). Review of Corporate Finance Studies 1: 68-108, 2012.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14972.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14972

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14972

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().