Never Waste a Good Crisis: An Historical Perspective on Comparative Corporate Governance

Randall Morck and Bernard Yeung

No 15042, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Different economies at different times use different institutional arrangements to constrain the people entrusted with allocating the economy's capital and other resources. Comparative financial histories show these corporate governance regimes to be largely stable through time, but capable of occasional dramatic change in response to a severe crisis. Legal origin, language, culture, religion, accidents of history (path dependence), and other factors affect these changes because they affect how people and societies solve problems.

JEL-codes: G01 G34 N2 P1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-hpe
Note: CF
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published as Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, 2009. "Never Waste a Good Crisis: An Historical Perspective on Comparative Corporate Governance," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 145-179, November.

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Journal Article: Never Waste a Good Crisis: An Historical Perspective on Comparative Corporate Governance (2009)
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