Position Auctions with Consumer Search

Susan Athey and Glenn Ellison ()

No 15253, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper examines a model in which advertisers bid for "sponsored-link" positions on a search engine. The value advertisers derive from each position is endogenized as coming from sales to a population of consumers who make rational inferences about firm qualities and search optimally. Consumer search strategies, equilibrium bidding, and the welfare benefits of position auctions are analyzed. Implications for reserve prices and a number of other auction design questions are discussed.

JEL-codes: D44 L86 M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mkt
Note: IO
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published as Susan Athey & Glenn Ellison, 2011. "Position Auctions with Consumer Search," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 126(3), pages 1213-1270.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15253.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Position Auctions with Consumer Search (2011)
Working Paper: Position Auctions with Consumer Search (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15253

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15253

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().