Soft Budgets and Renegotiations in Public-Private Partnerships

Eduardo Engel, Ronald Fischer and Alexander Galetovic

No 15300, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are increasingly used to provide infrastructure services. Even though PPPs have the potential to increase efficiency and improve resource allocation, contract renegotiations have been pervasive. We show that existing accounting standards allow governments to renegotiate PPP contracts and elude spending limits. Our model of renegotiations leads to observable predictions: (i) in a competitive market, firms lowball their offers, expecting to break even through renegotiation, (ii) renegotiations compensate lowballing and pay for additional expenditure, (iii) governments use renegotiation to increase spending and shift the burden of payments to future administrations, and (iv) there are significant renegotiations in the early stages of the contract, e.g. during construction. We use data on Chilean renegotiations of PPP contracts to examine these predictions and find that the evidence is consistent with the predictions of our model. Finally, we show that if PPP investments are counted as current government spending, the incentives to renegotiate contracts to increase spending disappear.

JEL-codes: H21 L51 L91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
Note: IO PE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (38)

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Working Paper: Soft Budgets and Renegotiations in Public-Private Partnerships (2009)
Working Paper: Soft budgets and Renegotiations in Public-Private Partnerships (2009)
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