Government Advertising and Media Coverage of Corruption Scandals
Rafael Di Tella and
Ignacio Franceschelli
No 15402, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
We construct measures of the extent to which the 4 main newspapers in Argentina report government corruption in their front page during the period 1998-2007 and correlate them with the extent to which each newspaper is a recipient of government advertising. The correlation is negative. The size is considerable: a one standard deviation increase in monthly government advertising (0.26 million pesos of 2000) is associated with a reduction in the coverage of the government's corruption scandals by 0.31 of a front page per month, or 25% of a standard deviation in our measure of coverage. The results are robust to the inclusion of newspaper, month, newspaper*president and individual-corruption scandal fixed effects as well as newspaper*president specific time trends.
JEL-codes: K42 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cul and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)
Published as Rafael Di Tella & Ignacio Franceschelli, 2011. "Government Advertising and Media Coverage of Corruption Scandals," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 119-51, October.
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Journal Article: Government Advertising and Media Coverage of Corruption Scandals (2011) 
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