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Executive Compensation: Facts

Gian Luca Clementi and Thomas Cooley

No 15426, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In this paper we describe the important features of executive compensation in the US from 1993 to 2006. Some confirm what has been found for earlier periods and some are novel. Important facts about compensation are that: the compensation distribution is highly skewed; each year, a sizeable fraction of chief executives lose money; the use of equity grants has increased; the income accruing to CEOs from the sale of stock has increased; regardless of the measure we adopt, compensation responds strongly to innovations in shareholder wealth; measured as dollar changes in compensation, incentives have strengthened over time, measured as percentage changes in wealth, they have not changed in any appreciable way.

JEL-codes: G30 J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-lab
Note: CF
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Executive Compensation: Facts (2010) Downloads
Working Paper: Executive Compensation: Facts (2010) Downloads
Working Paper: Executive Compensation: Facts (2009) Downloads
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