EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Oil and Democracy in Russia

Daniel Treisman

No 15667, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Russia is often considered a perfect example of the so-called "resource curse"--the argument that natural resource wealth tends to undermine democracy. Given high oil prices, some observers see the country as virtually condemned to authoritarian government for the foreseeable future. Reexamining various data, I show that such fears are exaggerated. Evidence from around the world suggests that for countries like Russia with an established oil industry, even large increases in the scale of mineral incomes have only a minor effect on the political regime. In addition, Russia--a country with an industrialized economy, a highly educated, urbanized population, and an oil sector that remains majority private-owned--is unlikely to be susceptible to most of the hypothesized pernicious effects of resource dependence.

JEL-codes: H1 H3 N54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-01
Note: POL
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published as Daniel Treisman. "Rethinking Russia : Is Russia Cursed by Oil?" Vol. 63, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2010. Page 85-102

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15667.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15667

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15667

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15667