Government Distortion in Independently Owned Media: Evidence from U.S. Cold War News Coverage of Human Rights

Nancy Qian and David Yanagizawa-Drott

No 15738, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper investigates the extent to which strategic objectives of the U.S. government influenced news coverage during the Cold War. We establish two relationships: 1) strategic objectives of the U.S. government cause the State Department to under-report human rights violations of strategic allies; and 2) these objectives reduce news coverage of human rights abuses for strategic allies in six U.S. national newspapers. To establish causality, we exploit plausibly exogenous variation in a country's strategic value to the U.S. from the interaction of its political alliance to the U.S. and membership on the United Nations Security Council. In addition to the main results, we are able to provide qualitative evidence and indirect quantitative evidence to shed light on the mechanisms underlying the reduced form effects.

JEL-codes: L82 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
Note: POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published as Nancy Qian & David Yanagizawa-Drott, 2017. "Government Distortion in Independently Owned Media: Evidence from U.S. News Coverage of Human Rights," Journal of the European Economic Association, vol 15(2), pages 463-499.

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