Economics of estate taxation: a brief review of theory and evidence
Wojciech Kopczuk
No 15741, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
This paper provides a non-technical overview of the economic arguments related to the desirability of transfer taxation and a summary of empirical evidence surrounding these issues. Understanding optimal transfer taxation throughout the distribution requires understanding the nature of a bequest motive, a topic on which there is little consensus. However, I argue that progress still can be made on the question of desirability and optimal level of estate taxation at the top of the distribution, because interpersonal externalities implied by the presence of bequest motive are irrelevant from the welfare point of view when the focus is on the wealthy. I also examine the role of negative externalities from wealth concentration in providing justification for considering this type of taxation.
JEL-codes: D6 D9 H2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc
Note: AG ME PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (44)
Published as "Economics of estate taxation: A brief review of theory and evidence," Tax Law Review, 2009, 63(1), 139-157.
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