Interest Groups, Information Manipulation in the Media, and Public Policy: The Case of the Landless Peasants Movement in Brazil

Lee Alston, Gary Libecap and Bernardo Mueller

No 15865, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We extend the literature on interest group behavior and policy outcomes by examining how groups with limited resources (votes and campaign contributions) effectively influence government by manipulating media information to voters. Voters in turn lobby politicians to implement the group's preferred policies. In this manner interest groups can secure favorable government actions beyond their size and wealth. This is an important contribution because of the increased role of the media in the information age and because this linkage better explains observed government policies. We develop a multi-principal, multi-task model of interest group behavior and generate the characteristics of interest groups that would be most successful using publicity to secure their policy objectives. We apply the model to the Landless Peasants' Movement in Brazil. We detail how the Landless Peasants' Movement molds information; show the general voter response; and examine the reaction of politicians in changing the timing and nature of policy.

JEL-codes: D23 D72 D78 O13 Q15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Note: DAE EEE LE POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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