How Do Employers React to A Pay-or-Play Mandate? Early Evidence from San Francisco

Carrie Colla, William Dow and Arindrajit Dube

No 16179, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In 2006 San Francisco adopted major health reform, becoming the first city to implement a pay-or-play employer health spending mandate. It also created Healthy San Francisco, a "public option" to promote affordable universal access to care. Using the 2008 Bay Area Employer Health Benefits Survey, we find that most employers (75%) had to increase health spending to comply with the law, yet most (64%) are supportive of the law. There is substantial employer demand for the public option, with 21% of firms using Healthy San Francisco for at least some employees, yet there is little evidence of firms dropping existing insurance offerings in the first year after implementation.

JEL-codes: I11 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-07
Note: EH
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published as Carrie H. Colla & William H. Dow & Arindrajit Dube, 2011. "How Do Employers React to a Pay-or-Play Mandate? Early Evidence from San Francisco," Forum for Health Economics & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 14(2), pages 4.

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Journal Article: How Do Employers React to a Pay-or-Play Mandate? Early Evidence from San Francisco (2013)
Journal Article: How Do Employers React to a Pay-or-Play Mandate? Early Evidence from San Francisco (2011)
Working Paper: How Do Employers React to a Pay-or-Play Mandate? Early Evidence from San Francisco (2010)
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