The Economics of Carbon Offsets

James Bushnell

No 16305, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Although international programs for carbon offsets play an important role in current and prospective climate-change policy, they continue to be very controversial. Asymmetric information creates several incentive problems, include adverse selection and moral hazard, in offset markets. The current regulatory focus on additionality tends to paint all these problems with a broad brush without proper consideration of the context or their implications.

JEL-codes: H23 L14 L5 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-ene, nep-env and nep-reg
Note: EEE
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Published as The Economics of Carbon Offsets , James B. Bushnell. in The Design and Implementation of US Climate Policy , Fullerton and Wolfram. 2012

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Chapter: The Economics of Carbon Offsets (2011)
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