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Overcoming the common pool problem through voluntary cooperation: the rise and fall of a fishery cooperative

Robert Deacon, Dominic Parker and Christopher Costello ()

No 16339, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We analyze a seldom used, but highly promising form of rights-based management over common pool resources that involves the self-selection of heterogeneous fishermen into sectors. The fishery management regime assigns one portion of an overall catch quota to a voluntary cooperative, with the remainder exploited as a commons by those choosing to fish independently. Data from an Alaska commercial salmon fishery confirm our model's key predictions, that the co-op would facilitate the consolidation of fishing effort, coordination of harvest activities, sharing of information and provision of shared infrastructure. We estimate that the resulting rent gains were at least 25%. A lawsuit filed by two disgruntled independents led to the co-op's demise, an outcome also predicted by our model. Our analysis provides guidance for designing fishery reform that leads to Pareto improvements for fishermen of all skill levels, which suggests a structure that enables reform without losers.

JEL-codes: Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-09
Note: EEE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed

Published as Robert Deacon, Dominic Parker, and Christopher Costello. Reforming fisheries: lessons from a self-selected cooperative. Journal of Law and Economics , 56:83–125, 2013.

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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16339