Counter-Suicide-Terrorism: Evidence from House Demolitions
Claude Berrebi () and
Esteban Klor ()
No 16493, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
This paper examines whether house demolitions are an effective counterterrorism tactic against suicide terrorism. We link original longitudinal micro-level data on houses demolished by the Israeli Defense Forces with data on the universe of suicide attacks against Israeli targets. By exploiting spatial and time variation in house demolitions and suicide terror attacks during the second Palestinian uprising, we show that punitive house demolitions (those targeting Palestinian suicide terrorists and terror operatives) cause an immediate, significant decrease in the number of suicide attacks. The effect dissipates over time and by geographic distance. In contrast, we observe that precautionary house demolitions (demolitions justified by the location of the house but not related to the identity or any action of the house's owner) cause a significant increase in the number of suicide terror attacks. The results are consistent with the view that selective violence is an effective tool to combat terrorist groups, whereas indiscriminate violence backfires.
JEL-codes: H56 K42 O53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: LE LS POL
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Published as Efraim Benmelech & Claude Berrebi & Esteban F. Klor, 2015. "Counter-Suicide-Terrorism: Evidence from House Demolitions," The Journal of Politics, vol 77(1), pages 27-43.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16493
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