Candidates, Character, and Corruption

B. Douglas Bernheim and Navin Kartik

No 16530, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study the characteristics of self-selected candidates in corrupt political systems. Potential candidates differ along two dimensions of unobservable character: public spirit (altruism toward others) and honesty (the disutility suffered when selling out to special interests after securing office). Both aspects combine to determine an individual's quality as governor. We characterize properties of equilibrium candidate pools for arbitrary costs of running for office, including the case where those costs become vanishingly small. We explore how policy instruments such as the governor's compensation and anti-corruption enforcement affect the expected quality of governance through candidate self-selection. We also show that self-selection can have surprising implications for the effect of information disclosures concerning candidates' backgrounds.

JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-11
Note: PE POL
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published as B. Douglas Bernheim & Navin Kartik, 2014. "Candidates, Character, and Corruption," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 205-46, May.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16530.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Candidates, Character, and Corruption (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16530

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16530

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().