A Dynamic Theory of Resource Wars

Daron Acemoglu, Mikhail Golosov, Aleh Tsyvinski and Pierre Yared

No 16682, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We develop a dynamic theory of resource wars and study the conditions under which such wars can be prevented. The interaction between the scarcity of resources and the incentives for war in the presence of limited commitment is at the center of our theory. We show that a key parameter determining the incentives for war is the elasticity of demand. Our first result identifies a novel externality that can precipitate war: price-taking firms fail to internalize the impact of their extraction on military action. In the case of inelastic resource demand, war incentives increase over time and war may become inevitable. Our second result shows that in some situations, regulation of prices and quantities by the resource-rich country can prevent war, and when this is the case, there will also be intertemporal distortions. In particular, resource extraction will tend to be slower than that prescribed by the Hotelling rule, which is the rate of extraction in the competitive environment. Our third result is that, due to limited commitment, such regulation can also precipitate war in some circumstances in which war is avoided in the competitive environment.

JEL-codes: F00 O1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-01
Note: EFG POL
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published as Daron Acemoglu & Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski & Pierre Yared, 2012. "A Dynamic Theory of Resource Wars," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(1), pages 283-331.

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Journal Article: A Dynamic Theory of Resource Wars (2012)
Working Paper: A Dynamic Theory of Resource Wars (2011)
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