Does Tax Policy Affect Executive Compensation? Evidence from Postwar Tax Reforms

Carola Frydman and Raven S. Molloy

No 16812, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The trends in executive pay and labor income tax rates since the 1940s suggest a high elasticity of taxable income with respect to tax policy. By contrast, the level and structure of executive compensation have been largely unresponsive to tax incentives since the 1980s. However, the relative tax advantage of different forms of pay was small during this period. Using a sample of top executives in large firms from 1946 to 2005, we also find a small short run response of salaries, qualified stock options, and bonuses paid after retirement to changes in tax rates on labor income--even though tax rates were significantly higher and more heterogeneous across individuals in the first several decades following WWII. We explore several potential explanations for the conflicting impressions given by the long-run and short-run correlations between taxes and pay, including changes in social norms and concerns about pay equality.

JEL-codes: G30 H24 H32 J31 J33 N32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-lab and nep-pbe
Note: CF DAE LS PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

Published as Frydman, Carola & Molloy, Raven S., 2011. "Does tax policy affect executive compensation? Evidence from postwar tax reforms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1425-1437.

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Journal Article: Does tax policy affect executive compensation? Evidence from postwar tax reforms (2011)
Working Paper: Does tax policy affect executive compensation? evidence from postwar tax reforms (2009)
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