Reestablishing the Income-Democracy Nexus
Jess Benhabib,
Alejandro Corvalan and
Mark Spiegel
No 16832, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
A number of recent empirical studies have cast doubt on the "modernization theory" of democratization, which posits that increases in income are conducive to increases in democracy levels. This doubt stems mainly from the fact that while a strong positive correlation exists between income and democracy levels, the relationship disappears when one controls for country fixed effects. This raises the possibility that the correlation in the data reflects a third causal characteristic, such as institutional quality. In this paper, we reexamine the robustness of the income-democracy relationship. We extend the research on this topic in two dimensions: first, we make use of newer income data, which allows for the construction of larger samples with more within-country observations. Second, we concentrate on panel estimation methods that explicitly allow for the fact that the primary measures of democracy are censored with substantial mass at the boundaries, or binary censored variables. Our results show that when one uses both the new income data available and a properly non linear estimator, a statistically significant positive income-democracy relationship is robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects.
JEL-codes: O10 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-02
Note: EFG POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (49)
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Working Paper: Reestablishing the income-democracy nexus (2011) 
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