Finance and Governance in Developing Economies

Randall Morck

No 16870, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Classic Big Push industrialization envisions state planners coordinating economic activity to internalize a range of externalities that otherwise lock in a low-income equilibrium, but runs afoul of well-known government failure problems. Successful Big Push coordination may occur instead when a large business group, acting in its controlling shareholder's self-interest, coordinates the establishment and expansion of businesses in diverse sectors. Where business groups play this role, many basic axioms of Anglo-American corporate governance, including the advocacy of shareholder value maximization and contestable corporate control, must be qualified.

JEL-codes: G3 O1 O25 P11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-03
Note: CF
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published as Randall Morck, 2011. "Finance and Governance in Developing Economies," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 375-406, December.

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Journal Article: Finance and Governance in Developing Economies (2011)
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