Tipping Climate Negotiations

Geoffrey Heal and Howard Kunreuther

No 16954, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Thinking about tipping provides a novel perspective on finding a way forward in climate negotiations and suggests an alternative to the current framework of negotiating a global agreement on reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Recent work on non-cooperative games shows games with increasing differences have multiple equilibria and have a "tipping set," a subset of agents who by changing from the inefficient to the efficient equilibrium can induce all others to do the same. We argue that international climate negotiations may form such a game and so have a tipping set. This set is a small group of countries who by adopting climate control measures can make in the interests of all others to do likewise.

JEL-codes: C72 F53 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-gth
Note: EEE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published as “Tipping Climate Negotiations” (with Geoffrey Heal). In: Climate Change and Common Sense: Essays in Honour of Tom Schelling. R. Hahn and A. Ulph (eds.) Oxford University Press (2012).

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