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The Value of Secure Property Rights: Evidence from Global Fisheries

Corbett Grainger and Christopher Costello ()

No 17019, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Property rights are commonly touted as a solution to common pool resource problems. But in practice the security of these property rights varies substantially owing to differences in design. In fisheries, the design of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) varies widely; the consequences of these design differences on economic outcomes has not been studied. To test whether the security of these property rights affects asset values, we compile a unique dataset to examine the relationship between the exclusivity of property rights and the dividend price ratios for ITQs. We find evidence that stronger property rights lead to higher asset values and lower dividend price ratios in ITQ fisheries. This pecuniary effect of property rights security informs the current policy debate on the design of property rights institutions for managing natural resources.

JEL-codes: G12 P14 Q2 Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env
Note: EEE
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