Committee Jurisdiction, Congressional Behavior and Policy Outcomes

John M. de Figueiredo

No 17171, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The literature on congressional committees has largely overlooked the impact of jurisdictional fights on policy proposals and outcomes. This paper develops a theory of how legislators balance the benefits of expanded committee jurisdiction against preferred policy outcomes. It shows why a) senior members and young members in safe districts are most likely to challenge a committee's jurisdiction; b) policy proposals may be initiated off the proposer's ideal point in order to obtain jurisdiction; c) policy outcomes will generally be more moderate with jurisdictional fights than without these turf wars. We empirically investigate these results examining proposed Internet intellectual property protection legislation in the 106th Congress.

JEL-codes: H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
Note: LE PE POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published as de Figueiredo, John M. (2013). “Committee Jurisdiction, Congressional Behavior, and Policy Outcomes,” Public Choice 154(1-2): 119-137.

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