Selecting the Best? Spillover and Shadows in Elimination Tournaments
Jennifer Brown and
Dylan B. Minor
No 17639, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
We consider how past, current, and future competition within an elimination tournament affect the probability that the stronger player wins. We present a two-stage model that yields the following main results: (1) a shadow effect--the stronger the expected future competitor, the lower the probability that the stronger player wins in the current stage and (2) an effort spillover effect--previous effort reduces the probability that the stronger player wins in the current stage. We test our theory predictions using data from high-stakes tournaments. Empirical results suggest that shadow and spillover effects influence match outcomes and have been already been priced into betting markets.
JEL-codes: J01 J3 J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm
Note: IO
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)
Published as Jennifer Brown & Dylan B. Minor, 2014. "Selecting the Best? Spillover and Shadows in Elimination Tournaments," Management Science, vol 60(12), pages 3087-3102.
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