Regulating Systemic Risk through Transparency: Tradeoffs in Making Data Public

Augustin Landier and David Thesmar

No 17664, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Public or partial disclosure of financial data is a key element in the design of a new regulatory environment. We study the costs and benefits of higher public access to financial data and analyze qualitatively how frequency, disclosure lag and granularity of such open data can be chosen to maximize welfare, depending on the relative magnitude of economic frictions. We lay out a simple framework to choose optimal transparency of financial data.

JEL-codes: D82 D83 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-12
Note: PE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Published as Regulating Systemic Risk through Transparency: Trade-Offs in Making Data Public , Augustin Landier, David Thesmar. in Risk Topography: Systemic Risk and Macro Modeling , Brunnermeier and Krishnamurthy. 2014

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17664.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Chapter: Regulating Systemic Risk through Transparency: Trade-Offs in Making Data Public (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17664

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17664

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().