International Policy Coordination: The Long View

Barry Eichengreen

No 17665, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper places current efforts at international economic policy coordination in historical perspective. It argues that successful cooperation is most likely in four sets of circumstances. First, when it centers on technical issues. Second, when cooperation is institutionalized - when procedures and precedents create presumptions about the appropriate conduct of policy and reduce the transactions costs of reaching an agreement. Third, when it is concerned with preserving an existing set of policies and behaviors (when it is concerned with preserving a policy regime). Fourth, when it occurs in the context of broad comity among nations. These points are elaborated through a review of 150 years of historical experience and then used to assess the scope for cooperative responses to the current economic crisis.

JEL-codes: F0 F3 N0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his
Note: DAE IFM
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published as International Policy Coordination: The Long View , Barry Eichengreen. in Globalization in an Age of Crisis: Multilateral Economic Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century , Feenstra and Taylor. 2014

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Chapter: International Policy Coordination: The Long View (2013)
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