Do Perceptions of Ballot Secrecy Influence Turnout? Results from a Field Experiment

Alan S. Gerber, Gregory A. Huber, David Doherty, Conor M. Dowling and Seth J. Hill

No 17673, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Although the secret ballot has long been secured as a legal matter in the United States, formal secrecy protections are not equivalent to convincing citizens that they may vote privately and without fear of reprisal. We present survey evidence that those who have not previously voted are particularly likely to voice doubts about the secrecy of the voting process. We then report results from a field experiment where we provided registered voters with information about ballot secrecy protections prior to the 2010 general election. We find that these letters increased turnout for registered citizens without records of previous turnout, but did not appear to influence the behavior of citizens who had previously voted. These results suggest that although the secret ballot is a long-standing institution in the United States, providing basic information about ballot secrecy can affect the decision to participate to an important degree.

JEL-codes: H0 H1 Z0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
Note: PE POL
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Published as "Do Perceptions of Ballot Secrecy Influence Turnout? Results from a Field Experiment" (with Huber, Doherty, Dowling, and Seth J. Hill). 2013. American Journal of Political Science (July). DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12019

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