Vote Trading With and Without Party Leaders

Alessandra Casella, Thomas Palfrey and Sébastien Turban

No 17847, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple majority. Individuals have different, privately observed intensities of preferences and before voting can buy or sell votes among themselves for money. We study the implication of such trading for outcomes and welfare when trades are coordinated by the two group leaders and when they take place anonymously in a competitive market. The theory has strong predictions. In both cases, trading falls short of full efficiency, but for opposite reasons: with group leaders, the minority wins too rarely; with market trades, the minority wins too often. As a result, with group leaders, vote trading improves over no-trade; with market trades, vote trading can be welfare reducing. All predictions are strongly supported by experimental results.

JEL-codes: C72 C78 C92 D70 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-02
Note: POL
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published as Journal of Public Economics Volume 112, April 2014, Pages 115–128 Cover image Vote trading with and without party leaders ☆ Alessandra Casellaa, b, c, , , Thomas Palfreyb, d, , Sébastien Turband,

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Journal Article: Vote trading with and without party leaders (2014)
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