EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Dynamic Adverse Selection: A Theory of Illiquidity, Fire Sales, and Flight to Quality

Veronica Guerrieri and Robert Shimer

No 17876, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We develop a dynamic equilibrium model of asset markets affected by adverse selection. There exists a unique equilibrium where better assets trade at higher prices but in less liquid markets. Sellers of high-quality assets can separate because they are more willing to accept a lower trading probability. As a result, the emergence of adverse selection generates a drop in liquidity. It may also lead to a decline in the price-dividend ratio--a fire sale--and a flight to quality. Subsidies to purchasing assets may be Pareto improving and can reverse the fire sale and flight to quality.

JEL-codes: D82 E44 G14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
Note: AP EFG
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

Published as Veronica Guerrieri & Robert Shimer, 2014. "Dynamic Adverse Selection: A Theory of Illiquidity, Fire Sales, and Flight to Quality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(7), pages 1875-1908, July.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17876.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Dynamic Adverse Selection: A Theory of Illiquidity, Fire Sales, and Flight to Quality (2014) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17876

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17876

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-31
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17876