Financial Regulation in General Equilibrium

Charles A.E. Goodhart, Anil Kashyap, Dimitrios Tsomocos and Alexandros P. Vardoulakis

No 17909, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper explores how different types of financial regulation could combat many of the phenomena that were observed in the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009. The primary contribution is the introduction of a model that includes both a banking system and a "shadow banking system" that each help households finance their expenditures. Households sometimes choose to default on their loans, and when they do this triggers forced selling by the shadow banks. Because the forced selling comes when net worth of potential buyers is low, the ensuing price dynamics can be described as a fire sale. The proposed framework can assess five different policy options that officials have advocated for combating defaults, credit crunches and fire sales, namely: limits on loan to value ratios, capital requirements for banks, liquidity coverage ratios for banks, dynamic loan loss provisioning for banks, and margin requirements on repurchase agreements used by shadow banks. The paper aims to develop some general intuition about the interactions between the tools and to determine whether they act as complements and substitutes.

JEL-codes: G38 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba and nep-reg
Note: ME CF EFG
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (78)

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Related works:
Chapter: FINANCIAL REGULATION IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM (2019)
Working Paper: Financial Regulation in General Equilibrium (2012)
Working Paper: Financial Regulation in General Equilibrium (2012)
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