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Platform Pricing at Sports Card Conventions

Ginger Zhe Jin and Marc Rysman

No 17959, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study a new data set of US sports card conventions in order to evaluate the pricing theory of two-sided markets. Conventions are two-sided because organizers must set fees to attract both consumers and dealers. We have detailed information on consumer price, dealer price and, since most conventions are local, the market structure for conventions. We present several findings: first, consumer pricing decreases with competition at any reasonable distance, but pricing to dealers is insensitive to competition and in longer distances even increases with competition. Second, when consumer price is zero (and thus constrained), dealer price decreases more strongly with competition. These results are compatible with existing models of two-sided markets, but are difficult to explain without such models.

JEL-codes: D4 L1 L8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mkt and nep-spo
Note: IO
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published as Ginger Zhe Jin & Marc Rysman, 2015. "Platform Pricing at Sports Card Conventions," The Journal of Industrial Economics, vol 63(4), pages 704-735.

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Journal Article: Platform Pricing at Sports Card Conventions (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Platform Pricing at Sports Card Conventions (2012) Downloads
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