The Cost of Financial Frictions for Life Insurers
Ralph Koijen and
No 18321, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
During the financial crisis, life insurers sold long-term policies at deep discounts relative to actuarial value. The average markup was as low as –19 percent for annuities and –57 percent for life insurance. This extraordinary pricing behavior was due to financial and product market frictions, interacting with statutory reserve regulation that allowed life insurers to record far less than a dollar of reserve per dollar of future insurance liability. We identify the shadow cost of capital through exogenous variation in required reserves across different types of policies. The shadow cost was $0.96 per dollar of statutory capital for the average company in November 2008.
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Published as Ralph S. J. Koijen & Motohiro Yogo, 2015. "The Cost of Financial Frictions for Life Insurers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(1), pages 445-75, January.
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Journal Article: The Cost of Financial Frictions for Life Insurers (2015)
Working Paper: The Cost of Financial Frictions for Life Insurers (2014)
Working Paper: The Cost of Financial Frictions for Life Insurers (2012)
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