Games and Resources

Bard Harstad and Matti Liski ()

No 18519, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This article presents a sequence of simple and related models to analyze the strategic use of natural resources. Game theory is the natural tool for such an analysis, whether the resource is private or publicly owned, whether it is renewable or exhaustible, whether the game is static or dynamic, and whether or not the users can strategically invest in technologies. Equilibrium extraction is too large and comes too early for public resources, but the opposite is true for private resources. The effects add up nicely when the resource has both private and public-good aspects.

JEL-codes: C7 H7 Q0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env
Note: EEE PE POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published as Harstad B., and Liski M. (2013) Games and Resources. In: Shogren, J.F., (ed.) “Encyclopedia of Energy, Natural Resource, and Environmental Economics”, Vol. 2, pp. 299-308 Amsterdam: Elsevier.

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