Participation and Duration of Environmental Agreements
Marco Battaglini () and
No 18585, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
We analyze participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs) in a dynamic game where countries pollute and invest in green technologies. If complete contracts are feasible, participants eliminate the hold-up problem associated with their investments; however, most countries prefer to free-ride rather than participate. If investments are non-contractible, countries face a hold-up problem every time they negotiate; but the free-rider problem can be mitigated and significant participation is feasible. Participation becomes attractive because only large coalitions commit to long-term agreements that circumvent the hold-up problem. Under well-specified conditions even the first-best outcome is possible when the contract is incomplete. Since real-world IEAs fit in the incomplete contracting environment, our theory may help explaining the rising importance of IEAs and how they should be designed.
JEL-codes: D86 F53 H87 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published as Marco Battaglini & B�rd Harstad, 2016. "Participation and Duration of Environmental Agreements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(1), pages 000 - 000.
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Journal Article: Participation and Duration of Environmental Agreements (2016)
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