Third-Party Opportunism and the Nature of Public Contracts

Marian Moszoro and Pablo Spiller

No 18636, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The lack of flexibility in public procurement design and implementation reflects public agents' political risk adaptation to limit hazards from opportunistic third parties - political opponents, competitors, interest groups - while externalizing the associated adaptation costs to the public at large. Reduced flexibility limits the likelihood of opportunistic challenge lowering third parties' expected gains and increasing litigation costs. We provide a comprehensible theoretical framework with empirically testable predictions.

JEL-codes: D23 D72 D73 D78 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-pol
Note: LE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

Published as 11. Third-party opportunism and the theory of public contracts: operationalization and applications Marian W. Moszoro and Pablo T. Spiller The Manufacturing of Markets Legal, Political and Economic Dynamics Editors: Eric Brousseau, Université de Paris IX (Paris-Dauphine) Jean-Michel Glachant, European University Institute, Florence View all contributors Date Published: May 2014 availability: Available format: Hardback isbn: 9781107053717

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