Modest, Secure and Informed: Successful Development in Conflict Zones

Eli Berman, Joseph Felter, Jacob N. Shapiro and Erin Troland

No 18674, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Most interpretations of prevalent counterinsurgency theory imply that increasing government services will reduce rebel violence. Empirically, however, development programs and economic activity sometimes yield increased violence. Using new panel data on development spending in Iraq, we show that violence reducing effects of aid are greater when (a) projects are small, (b) troop strength is high, and (c) professional development expertise is available. These findings are consistent with a "hearts and minds" model, which predicts that violence reduction will result when projects are secure, valued by community members, and implementation is conditional on the behavior of non-combatants.

JEL-codes: F52 F63 F68 H41 H56 K42 N45 O1 O17 Z1 Z12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ppm
Note: PE POL
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (46)

Published as Eli Berman & Joseph H. Felter & Jacob N. Shapiro & Erin Troland, 2013. "Modest, Secure, and Informed: Successful Development in Conflict Zones," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(3), pages 512-17, May.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18674.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Modest, Secure, and Informed: Successful Development in Conflict Zones (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18674

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18674

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().