It Pays to Set the Menu: Mutual Fund Investment Options in 401(k) Plans
Veronika K. Pool,
Clemens Sialm () and
No 18764, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
This paper investigates whether mutual fund families acting as trustees of 401(k) plans display favoritism toward their own funds. Using a hand-collected dataset on retirement investment options, we show that poorly-performing funds are less likely to be removed from and more likely to be added to a 401(k) menu if they are affiliated with the plan trustee. We find no evidence that plan participants undo this affiliation bias through their investment choices. Finally, the subsequent performance of poorly-performing affiliated funds indicates that these trustee decisions are not information driven and are costly to retirement savers.
JEL-codes: G02 G11 G23 H55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem
Note: AG AP CF PE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Published as Veronika K. Pool & Clemens Sialm & Irina Stefanescu, 2016. "It Pays to Set the Menu: Mutual Fund Investment Options in 401(k) Plans," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 71(4), pages 1779-1812, 08.
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: It Pays to Set the Menu: Mutual Fund Investment Options in 401(k) Plans (2016)
Working Paper: It Pays to Set the Menu: Mutual Fund Investment Options in 401(k) plans (2014)
Working Paper: It Pays to Set the Menu: Mutual Fund Investment Options in 401(k) Plans (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18764
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().