Aggregating Local Preferences to Guide Marginal Policy Adjustments
Daniel Benjamin,
Ori Heffetz,
Miles Kimball and
Nichole Szembrot
No 18787, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
We propose a social choice rule for aggregating preferences elicited from surveys into a marginal adjustment of policy from the status quo. The mechanism is: (i) symmetric in its treatment of survey respondents; (ii) ordinal, using only the orientation of respondents' indifference surfaces; (iii) local, using only preferences in the neighborhood of current policy; and (iv) what we call "first-order strategy-proof," making the gains from misreporting preferences second order. The mechanism could be applied to guide policy based on how policy affects responses to subjective well-being surveys.
JEL-codes: D69 H0 I38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-02
Note: AG PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)
Published as Daniel J. Benjamin & Ori Heffetz & Miles S. Kimball & Nichole Szembrot, 2013. "Aggregating Local Preferences to Guide Marginal Policy Adjustments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(3), pages 605-10, May.
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