Exploring Tradeoffs in the Organization of Scientific Work: Collaboration and Scientific Reward

Michaël Bikard, Fiona E. Murray and Joshua Gans

No 18958, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: When do scientists and other knowledge workers organize into collaborative teams and why do they do so for some projects and not others? At the core of this important organizational choice is, we argue, a tradeoff between the productive efficiency of collaboration and the credit allocation that arises after the completion of collaborative work. In this paper, we explore this tradeoff by developing a model to structure our understanding of the factors shaping researcher collaborative choices in particular the implicit allocation of credit among participants in scientific projects. We then use the annual research activity of 661 faculty scientists at one institution over a 30-year period to explore the tradeoff between collaboration and reward at the individual faculty level and to infer critical parameters in the organization of scientific work.

JEL-codes: O31 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-hrm, nep-ppm and nep-sog
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published as Michaël Bikard & Fiona Murray & Joshua S. Gans, 2015. "Exploring Trade-offs in the Organization of Scientific Work: Collaboration and Scientific Reward," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(7), pages 1473-1495, July.

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Journal Article: Exploring Trade-offs in the Organization of Scientific Work: Collaboration and Scientific Reward (2015)
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