Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State

David Levine and Salvatore Modica

No 19221, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their "exclusiveness" we find that these hegemonies will be inefficiently "extractive" in the sense of having inefficiently high taxes, high compensation for state officials, and low welfare.

JEL-codes: A10 C0 C00 C70 C72 C73 D0 D00 D01 D02 D03 D3 D42 D61 D63 D71 D72 D73 D74 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-evo, nep-mic and nep-pol
Note: EFG POL
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19221.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State (2013)
Working Paper: Conflict, evolution, hegemony, and the power of the state (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19221

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19221

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().